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Historical Quirks, Political Opportunism, and the
Anti·Loan Provision of the Sarbanes...Qxley Act

lAYNE W. BARNARD•

I. INTRODUCTION

Legislation often has surprising origins. For example, the story is told
that Governor Nelson Rockefeller devised his infamous "Rockefeller drug
laws" on the slimmest thread of background information.
At a party in March, 1972, Rockefeller had chatted with William
Fine, then the president of Bonwit Teller. The two men talked about
narcotics-a topic Fine was especially interested in because his son
was an addict. Rockefeller asked him to go to Japan and figure out
why that nation had the world's lowest rate of addiction. Fine
financed his own trip and returned with an answer: lifetime prison
sentences for drug sellers. 1

* James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. Thanks to Ted Cundick,
William & Mary class of 2004, and Mark B. Carson, Kerry Eaton, Heidi Brown, and Carl Beattie, all of
the William & Mary class of2005, for their help in researching portions of this article. Thanks also to John
Tucker, who (as always) wielded his editing pen to improve the manuscript. Thanks finally to Justin
Dillmore and Peg Schultz for their hospitality at Ohio Northern University and to Michael Palumbo and
Erica Veljic for their editing help.
I . JENNIFER GoNNERMAN, l.JFE ON THE OliTSIDE: THE PRisON ODYSSEY OF ELAINE BARTLETI 52
(2004):
Rockefeller's staff balked at the news of this proposal, but he refused to listen to any of their
doubts. [According to Rockefeller's former speechwriter,] [h]is drug proposal became an
"are you with me or against me" test of loyalty, and staffers quickly realized that if they did
not implement the governor's plan, they would have to start polishing their resumes. "I
never fully understood the psychological milieu in which the chain of errors in Vietnam was
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Another story has been told of how the word "sex" was included as a
protected class in Title VII just hours before Congress passed the statute.
According to Congressional folklore, its inclusion was a joke.2
This is the story of another piece oflegislation that has surprising origins:
the anti-loan provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 3 In this article, I will
review the drumbeat of events and political steps that led to the enactment of
the anti-loan provision, suggest some of the questions that were neither asked
nor answered prior to its enactment, and describe some of the problems that
have emerged in its wake.
I tell this story in the shadow of an elegant new book by Malcolm
Gladwell called Blink: The Power ofThinking without Thinking. 4 In his book,
Gladwell extolls the power of intuitive thinking, the "rightness" of first
impressions, and the benefits of snap judgments. According to Gladwell,
acting on only the smallest bits of information-what he calls "thin-slicing"
-"often delivers a better answer than more deliberate and exhaustive ways
of thinking." 5
In this article, I will ask whether the "thin slicing" that led to enactment
of the anti-loan provision in the summer of 2002 offers an example of Gladwell's theory. That is, I will ask whether enactment of the anti-loan provision,
which occurred virtually overnight, resulted in a "blatantly needed [and overdue] reform" 6 or, as critics have recently suggested, a classic case of

forged until I became involved in the Rockefeller drug proposal."
2. BARBARA WHALEN & CHARLES WHALEN, THE LoNGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE 1964CIVn..RlGHTSAcr233-34(1985); see also 110CONG. REc. 2581 (1964) (statement of Rep. Edith
Green) (suggesting that Rep. Howard W. Smith proposed to insert "sex" in the bill to prevent the passage
of Title Vll). But see Michael C. Falk, Note, Lost in the Language: The Conflict Between the
Congressional Purpose and Statutory Language of Federal Employment Discrimination Legislation, 35
RUTGERSL. J. 1179, 1189 n.35 (2004) (noting recent scholarship arguing that the inclusion of"sex" in the
bill was strategic and not a joke).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2004).
4. See generally MALCOLM GLADWEll, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING
(2005).
5. /d. at 34. To be fair, Gladwell also discusses some of the perils of ''thin slicing" and snap
judgments: erroneous judgments based on racial prejudice, hideous mistakes made under stress, and
decision making limited by comfort, custom, and familiarity.
6. Sean A. Power, Comment, Sarbanes-Oxley Ends Corporate Lending to Insiders: Some
Interpretive Issuesfor Executive Compensation Surrounding the Section 402 Loan Prohibition, 71 UMKC
L. REv. 911 , 912 (2003).
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"overreaction,"7"a case of severe [legislative] overreaching,'' 8 and a "public
policy error. " 9

II. THE ANTI-LOAN PROVISION OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
The anti-loan provision of Sarbanes-Oxley is straightforward:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer ... directly or indirectly, including
through any subsidiary, to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the
extension of credit, or to renew an extension of credit, in the form of
a personal loan to or for any director or executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of that issuer. An extension of credit maintained by the
issuer on the date of enactment of this subsection shall not be subject
to the provisions of this subsection, provided that there is no material
modification to any term of any such extension of credit or any
renewal of any such extension of credit on or after that date [... ] . 10
This provision was as close as Congress was willing to come in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to reining in what was seen in the decade leading up to
the enactment of the statute as excessive executive compensation.•• Its
passage "proved very disruptive of standard arrangements at many corporations."12
Congressional interest in insider loans first surfaced during Senate hearings into the Enron disaster in February, 2002, when former SEC Chairman
Richard Breeden testified before the Senate Banking Committee, and
recommended both increased disclosure of insider loans and, in some cases,
shareholder approval of those loans. 13 But the story leading up to enactment
of the anti-loan provision, like the stories underlying many pieces of federal

7. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It
Might Just Work), 36 U. CONN. L. REV. 9I5, 927 (2003).
8. M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks, Executive
Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, at http://ssm.com/abstract=597661 (forthcoming 2005).
9. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-OxleyActand the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
http://ssm.com/abstract=596101 (forthcoming 2005).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2004).
II . See Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Executive Compensation to Realign
Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 971, 1001-02 (2004) ("[The anti-loan] prohibition is designed as an indirect means of
limiting corporate executives' ability to acquire equity stakes without out-of-pocket expenditures....This
prohibition is also designed to address a disturbing trend of corporate debt forgiveness.").
12. Roberta S. Karmei, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate
Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REv. 849, 868 (2004).
13. See Romano, supra note 9, at 150-52 (describing early, very superficial, discussions of insider
loans during Senate hearings).
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legislation, is not linear. It begins with the unraveling of several large public
companies in 2001-2002, all of which had made significant loans to their
officers or directors. Then, some unseemly revelations about President
George W. Bush's personal business dealings in the late 1980s, a plummeting
stock market, and a grandstanding Senator all converged on a jittery Congress
in July, 2002, when the anti-loan provision was proposed and adopted without
so much as an intelligent conversation. Here, in a nutshell, are the critical
points leading up to enactment of the anti-loan provision.
ill. THE ORIGINS OF THE ANTI-LOAN PROVISION

What were the origins of the anti-loan provision? I'd like to claim that
a 1988 law review article criticizing insider loans 14 played some role. More
likely, however, the origins of the anti-loan provision can be traced, as the Act
itself can be traced, to the unfolding of the Enron story in the fall of 2001 and
the scandals that followed: WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia. It can also be
traced to a series of bankruptcy filings of high-profile public companies.
Between July, 2001, and December, 2002, seven suchcompanies-Comdisco,
Enron, K-Mart, Global Crossing, Adelphia, WorldCom, and Conseco--were
found to have extended massive loans to their officers and directors, many of
them later "forgiven." 15
A. The Back Story

1. The "Big Four" Scandals
The story of the anti-loan provision begins with the disclosure that Ken
Lay, Chairman of Enron Corporation, had received some $81.5 million in
loans from the company during the period 2000-2001. 16 Lay repaid these
loans with shares of Enron stock, which permitted him to avoid contemporaneous disclosure of his sales. As described in the report of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee,
[Enron' s] Compensation Committee had already given Mr. Lay a 4
million line of credit which, in August 2001, it increased to $7.5
million. During their interviews, the Committee members said that
they knew of the line of credit, but had been unaware that, in 2000,
Mr. Lay began using what one Board member called an "ATM

14. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank?,
1988 W1s. L. REv. 237 (1988).
15. See infra Section IDA.
16. Mitchell Pacelle, Enron 's Disclosure ofAwards to Top Officials Draws Outrage, WALL ST. J.,
June 18, 2002, at CIS.
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approach" toward that credit line, repeatedly drawing down the entire
amount available and then repaying the loan with Enron stock.
Records show that Mr. Lay at frrst drew down the line of credit once
per month, then every two weeks, and then, on some occasions,
several days in a row. In the one-year period from October 2000 to
October 2001, Mr. Lay used the credit line to obtain over $77 million
in cash from the company and repaid the loans exclusively with Enron
stock. Several Directors confrrmed that Mr. Lay still owed the
company about $7 million. 17
Another company whose insider loans drew widespread attention was
WorldCom, Inc. In March, 2002, the company revealed that, beginning in
2000 and throughout 2001, it had loaned its Chairman and CEO, Bernard J.
Ebbers, nearly $350 million to cover personal debts. 18 The WorldCom loans
required payment of interest at below-market rates (estimated at 2.15%) 19 and
were unsecured. "Never before, apparently, had a board of directors lent so
much cash to the board's own chairman .... " 20
The loans were later detailed in the company's proxy statement,
concurrent with the announcement of Ebbers' resignation. 21 They included
$198.7 million paid to Bank of America to reduce Ebbers' personal debts, $35
million deposited to collateralize a letter of credit in favor of Ebbers, and $165
million loaned directly to Ebbers.22 The proxy explained that the board had
approved the loans and related commitments "following a determination that
they were in the best interests of WorldCom and our shareholders ... .'723
The story behind the loans was this: Ebbers had borrowed privately from
Bank of America, using his WorldCom stock for collateral. When
WorldCom's share price began dropping in 2000, Ebbers faced a margin call
and sold some three million shares of WorldCom stock.24 When the share
price continued to fall,

17. The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron' s Collapse: Report Prepared by the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. REP. No. 107-70, at 53
(2002), available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov_affairs/070702enronreport.pdf.
18. Joann S. Lublin & Shawn Young, WorldCom Loan to CEO of $341 Million Is the Most
Generous in Recent Memory, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at A3.
19. Peter Siris, Loans, Options: Double Trouble, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 25, 2002, at 38.
20. Geoffrey Colvin, Money Woes Strike Ex-CEO's: Bernie Ebbers Owes WorldCom $408 Million
and Can't Pay, FORTUNE, June 24, 2002, at 48.
21. WorldCom, Inc., Proxy Statement, Apr. 22, 2002, at 13-15.
22. /d. at 14.
23. /d.
24. Joann S. Lublin & Jared Sandberg, Deadbeat CEOs Plague Firms as Economy and Markets
Roil, WAll ST. J ., Aug. 1, 2002, at A 1.
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WorldCom' s directors began to worry about what would happen if
Mr. Ebbers kept selling stock. They discussed the possibility that the
price of WorldCom stock would drop on news that Mr. Ebbers was
dumping his shares, according to several board members. Directors
also were concerned that if Mr. Ebbers continued to sell his shares it
would wipe him out financially and leave him without a stake in the
company he ran.25
Thus, the board decided to guarantee $100 million of Ebbers' loan and later
loaned him an additional $100 million, all with the intention of forestalling an
Ebbers sell-off of WorldCom stock.26 Then, without much further thought on
the subject, "the guarantee and the loan grew over time.'m Ultimately, the
price ofWorldCom stock continued to decline and WorldCom was forced to
pay Bank of America $198.7 million to cover the loans it had guaranteed. 28
By April, 2002, Ebbers was indebted to the company for $402 million (including accrued interest), with little likelihood that he would ever be able to meet
his obligations. 29 The company soon thereafter filed for protection under
Chapter 11, the biggest bankruptcy in American history. 30 It turned out that
WorldCom's financial statements had been overstated by some $11 billion. 31
(Bernie Ebbers was ultimately convicted of securities and wire fraud). 32
In addition to the Lay and Ebbers insider loans there was also another
rapacious CEO, Dennis Kozlowski ofTyco, International, Inc. Who, in June,
2002, resigned in the face of allegations that he had used company
funds-borrowed from a corporate account intended for other purposes-to
purchase millions of dollars in artwork for his home. 33 Kozlowski was

25. ld.
26. ld.
27. ld.
28. ld.
29. See Colvin, supra note 20; WorldCom, Inc., Proxy Statement, supra note 21 (stating that Ebbers
was scheduled to repay the loans on the following schedule: $25 million on Apr. 29, 2003,$25 million on
Apr. 29, 2004; $75 million on Apr. 29, 2005, $100 million on Apr. 29, 2006 and all remaining principal
on Apr. 29, 2007).
30. Andrew Backover, WorldCom Files for Chapter 11 Protection, USA TODAY, July 22, 2002, at
1A.
31. Christopher Stem, WorldComAuditors Find More Errors: $3.8 Billion Added to Earlier Total,
WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at Al.
32. Brooke A. Masters, WorldCom 's Ebbers Convicted: Jury Finds Former CEO Guilty on All Nine
Counts, WASH. POST, Mar. 16,2005, at Al.
33. Alex Berenson, Tyco Chief Out as Tax Inquiry Picks Up Speed, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 2002, at
Al.
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ultimately indicted for tax fraud for failing to pay the required sales tax on the
artwork.34
At first, it was reported that the funds Kozlowski had used to purchase
his paintings were borrowed from Tyco through an executive loan program
that was "supposed to be used for a different purpose helping top employees
pay taxes that become due upon the vesting, or taking full ownership, of
restricted stock awards. " 35 According to one critic, the fund was not supposed
to be used "where the company serves as a bank for employees to use for
personal purposes."36
As the story unfolded, though, Kozlowski's misuse of insider loans
seemed even more remarkable than had at first been reported. First,
Kozlowski was alleged to have borrowed some $270 million-not just $13
million-from a loan program intended to help him pay taxes on restricted
stock grants. Prosecutors claimed he had used 90% of the borrowed funds to
purchase a yacht, jewelry, fine art, and real estate.37 Then, they alleged,
Kozlowski borrowed an additional $46 million in interest-free "relocation"
loans, which he used to buy luxury properties in New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Manhattan. 38 Other executives, too, were
alleged to have abused Tyco's relocation loan fund. 39 (The criminal case
against Kozlowski ended in a mistrial and is currently being retried).40
One more scandal fed into this sorry mix. On March 27, 2002, Adelphia
Communications Corporation, a national cable television provider, filed a
report with the SEC in which it revealed for the first time that the family of
John J. Rigas, founder and CEO of Adelphia, had extracted billions of dollars
from the company for his personal use. 41 Some of the problem involved loans
made or guaranteed by the company without the knowledge of the board of
directors. 42 The Rigases had also used corporate funds to finance unrelated

34. Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Ex-Tyco ChiefEvaded $1 Million in Taxes on Art, Indictment
Says, WALL ST. J ., June 5, 2002, at A 1.
35. Mark Maremont et al., Probe of Ex-Tyco Chief Focuses on Improper Use of Company Funds,
WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at AI.
36. Maremont & Markon, supra note 34, at AI (quoting Washington securities lawyer Alan Dye).
37. Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Fonner Tyco Executives Are Charged, WALL ST. J ., Sept. 13,
2002, at A3.
38. Id.
39. Laurie P. Cohen & John Hechinger, Tyco Suits Say Clandestine Facts Led to Payments, WALL
ST. J., June 18, 2002, at A3.
40. Walter Hamilton, Re-trial of Tyco Ex-Executives Starts: A New York Prosecutor Says the
Former CEO and Finance Chief Stole $150 Million to Finance Their Luxury Lifestyles, L.A. TIMEs, Jan.
27,2005, at C3.
41. See Adelphia Communications Corp. v. Rigas, Case No. 02-41729 (REG), U.S. Bankr., S.D.
N.Y., Compl. (on file with author).
42. ld. at Tli 71, 78, liS, 117.
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business ventures,43 to pay for relatives' living quarters in New York,44 to
engage in extravagant family travel, 45 and to purchase Adelphia stock on the
open market.46 After a forensic accounting ordered by the frrm's board of
directors, the company sued the Rigases, alleging "one of the largest cases of
corporate looting and self-dealing in American corporate history. " 47 The
Rigases were also charged by the SEC with securities fraud and "rampant selfdealing."48 And the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York
indicted the Rigases, alleging mail fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, and
securities fraud. 49 The government claimed the family had used the company
as its "personal piggy bank"5° and engaged in a "wide variety of ... brazen
thefts." 51 (Ultimately, John Rigas and his son Timothy were convicted of
these crimes, and recently agreed to forfeit $1.5 billion to settle the civil
claims against them. 52 The company filed for Chapter 11 protection in June,
2002).53
2. Four More Troubling Bankruptcies
During the period of July, 2001 through December, 2002, not only did
Enron, W orldCom, and Adelphia file for protection under Chapter 11, four
more high-profile companies did the same, and each one revealed that it, too,
had extended significant insider loans to its executives.
The first of these was Comdisco, Inc., a high-tech security company.
During the Internet boom, Comdisco had loaned 106 of its employees some
$104 million to purchase the company's stock. When the Internet bubble
burst, and the price of the stock plunged, the loans remained outstanding. Not
only did Comdisco face bankruptcy (it filed in the summer of 2001), so did
many of its employees. 54

43. !d. at 1:89.
44. /d. at<JI 105.
45. /d. at 1: 104.
46. /d. at <JI 74.
47. Adelphia Communications Corp., Compl. at ')l2.
48. SEC Charges Adelphia and Rigas Family with Massive Financial Fraud, SEC Press Release
2002-110, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-IIO.htm.
49. See Jerry Markon & Robert Frank, Five Adelphia Officials Arrested on Fraud Charges, WALL
ST. J., July 25, 2002, at A3.
50. Carrie Johnson & Christopher Stem, Adelphia Founder, Sons Charged: Family Looted Sixth
Lorgest Cable 7Y Company, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, July 25, 2002, at AI.
51. /d.
52. Sallie Hofmeister, Adelphia 's Founders to Forfeit Assets, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, at AI.
53. Deborah Solomon, Adelphia Communications Files for Bankruptcy-Court Protection, WAU..
ST. J., June 26, 2002, at A3.
54. Howard Wolinsky, Ex-Comdisco Execs Sued over Loans: lAwsuits Target 76 Who Borrowed
$74 Million to Buy Company Stock, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at 43.
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K-Mart Corporation filed under Chapter 11 in January, 2002. The press
reported that several of its executives had received more than $30 million in
"retention loans" just prior to the bankruptcy filing. 55 The idea was that, by
offering "retention loans," K-Mart would dissuade its best executives from
leaving the company while it was struggling in Chapter 11. In theory, loan repayment would be forgiven if the executives stayed for the duration of thereorganization proceeding. But more than $18 million of the total loan amount
went to executives who left the company within weeks of the Chapter 11
filing. 5 6 K-Mart later sued to recover some of the outstanding loans. 57
Just one week after K-Mart's bankruptcy filing, Global Crossing Ltd., a
telecorrununications frrm, also filed under Chapter 11. Soon, the press reported that the company had forgiven a $10 million interest-free loan to its CEO,
John Legere, just weeks before filing for bankruptcy protection. 58 In this case,
the loan had been made as part of a "signing bonus. " 59 One more company
emerged with insider loan issues during the summer of 2002. Conseco, Inc.,
a financial services company, revealed that, beginning in 1996, it had
guaranteed some $700 million in loans to 155 of its executives to enable them
to purchase Conseco shares.60 Beginning in 2001, the value of the shares
began to drop, and the borrowers soon had no reasonable hope of repayment.61
The company's guarantee obligation contributed to Conseco's bankruptcy
filing in December, 2002. 62 (The company later engaged in a bitter lawsuit
with its former CEO to recover the unpaid amount of the loan, and is now in
the process of executing its $72 million judgment).63

55. Amy Merrick, K-Mart Officers Got Big Loans Before It Filedfor Chapter 11, WAIL ST. I., Apr.
17,2002, at Bl.
56. /d.
57. Rachel Katz, Restructuring Kmart Names New CEO: President Julian Day Replaces James
Adamson in Taking Firm Out of Chapter 11, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at Bus. 3.
58. Elizabeth Douglass, Global Eased Loan Terms: Compensation: The Firm Forgave or Reduced
Advances to Executives in the Months Before its Chapter 11 Filing, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2002, at C 1. According to the recipient, John Legere, the loan "was never designed to be repaid ... and was set up as a loan
solely for tax reasons." Elizabeth Douglass, Big Payday for CEO as Firm Sinks: Telecom Global Crossing's John Legere Gets Millions, Including a Promotion Severance, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,2002, at AI.
59. Rebecca Blumens & Deborah Solomon, As Global Crossing Crashed, Executives Got Loan
Relief, Pension Payouts, WAIL ST. J., Feb. 21,2002, at Bl.
60. Bill W. Hornaday, Write-Offs Drive Loss at Conseco: CEO Gary Wendt Cites $98.1 Million in
Charges in Disappointing Quarter, but Says Turnaround is on Track, INDIANAPOUS STAR, Feb. 22, 2002,
at Bus. lC.
61. Aoyd Norris, 3 Ex-Chiefs Discover the Perils of Borrowing and Believing, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 2002, at C I.
62. J.K Wall, Hilbert Ruling Ominous for "Big 11 ,": Similarities of Ex-Conseco Brass's Cases
Key, INDIANAPOUS STAR, Nov. 15, 2004, at IC.
63. I. K . Wall, Hilbert's Leftovers Go Up for Auction: About $10,000 Worth of Items That Were
Not Sold in the First Event Will beAvailable Today,INDIANAPOUS STAR, Mar. 7, 2005, at 1C.
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These eight cases-and especially the "big four" scandals-painted an
ugly picture of insider loans. It would have been fair on this evidence to
assume that insider loans were disproportionately associated with companies
on the verge of bankruptcy, companies in which egregious accounting
violations and other misconduct was also going on, and companies whose
leadership posed a grave threat to public confidence in the capital markets.
It might also have been fair to assume that the practice of making insider loans
had grown totally out of control.64
B. President Bush's Response to Concerns about Corporate Greed

The Bush administration responded reluctantly to the clamor for
corporate governance reform that emerged following the collapse of Enron.
On March 7, 2002, President Bush announced his reform agenda, emphasizing
the need for responsible self-governance rather than specific corrective
legislation. "The whole design of free-market capitalism depends upon free
people acting responsibly," he said. "Business people must answer not just
to the demands of the markets or self-interest but to the demands of conscience."65
That being said, the President did announce his support for a new federal
agency that would monitor accounting firms and a ban on public accounting
firms performing both audit and non-audit functions for their clients, at least
where such work would compromise the independence of the audit. 66 He also
called for the return by executives of performance-based compensation awards
where a company restated earlier financial statements.67 Finally, the President
called for CEOs to vouch for the "veracity, timeliness and fairness" of the
information contained in their financial statements.68
There was no mention of outlawing insider loans in President Bush's
Ten-Point Plan, but then again, the revelations about insider loans at
WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco were still over the horizon.
C. Congress's Response to Concerns About Corporate Greed
Throughout the spring of 2002, both the Senate and House conducted
hearings on Enron and entertained dozens of legislative proposals. House

64. According to a report published in December, 2002, insider loans had grown to the remarkable
sum of $4.5 billion. Paul Hodgson, My Big Fat Corporate Loan, at www.thecorporatelibrary.com.
65. Press Release, Office of White House Press Secretary, President Outlines Plan to Improve
Corporate Responsibility (Mar. 7, 2002), at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002103/200203073.html.
66. /d.
67. /d.
68. /d.
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Democrats pressed for passage of tough regulatory bills called the Comprehensive Investor Protection Act69 and the Corporate Responsibility Act of
2002.70 Ultimately, a far more moderate Republican bill-the Corporate and
Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 200271passed the House on April 24, 2002, with widespread bipartisan support. 72
Then, the progress of post-Enron reform legislation seemed to stall. 73
The White House was preoccupied with homeland security issues, and
Congress was equally preoccupied with issues such as the "patients' bill of
rights." It almost seemed as if the Congress didn't notice what was happening
in the national securities marketplace, but a simple timeline suggests what in
fact was going on. Between April24, when the House corporate reform bill
passed, and the second week of July, when the Senate began moving in earnest
on corporate reform, several noteworthy events had occurred: ( 1) Tyco CEO
Dennis Kozlowski resigned in disgrace; 74 (2) WorldCom revealed that it had
overstated its cash flow by over $3 billion dollars; 75 (3) Xerox announced that
it, too, would be making a $1.4 billion restatement; 76 (4) WorldCom's CEO
Bernie Ebbers and CFO Scott Sullivan declined to testify in front of the House
Financial Services Committee;77 and (5) Qwest Communications intimated
that it would be making a $1 billion restatement. 78
By mid-July, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down 20% from the
first of the year, and other major indexes were down even further. 79 Both the
S&P 500 stock index and the Dow fell to their lowest levels in five years. 80

69. Comprehensive Investor Protection Act, H.R. 3818, 107th Cong. (2002).
70. The Corporate Responsibility Act of 2002, H.R. 4083, l07th Cong. (2002).
71. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002 H.R.
3763, 107th Cong. (2002).
72. Michael Schroeder, House, in Bipanisan Vote, Backs Moderate Accounting Overhaul, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at A2.
73. See David S. Hilzenrath, Senate Set for Action to Refonn Audit Sector: Corporate Scandals
Spur Call for Tougher Rule, WASH. POST, July 7, 2002, at A1 (noting that "[j]ust weeks ago, the legislative
fervor that followed the December collapse of Enron Corp. appeared to have cooled, and efforts to impose
new discipline on corporate auditors seemed to have sputtered in the Senate").
74. Berenson, supra note 33, at Al.
75. Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8
Billion, N.Y. TIMEs, June 26,2002, at Al.
76. Mark Maremont, Xerox Overstates Pretax Income by $1.41 Billion, Filing Reveals, WALL ST.
J., July 1, 2002, at A3.
77. Simon Romero & Floyd Norris, 2 Former WorldCom Executives Refuse to Testify to Congress,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at Cl.
78. Simon Romero & Kenneth N. Gilpin, New Executives May Restate Qwest Results for Last Year,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 13,2002, at Cl.
79. Jonathan Fuerbringer, Market Continues Four-Month Rout: Dow Plunges 390, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2002, at Al.
80. Rob Walker, Crisis, What Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002, § 4, at 4.

336

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

Throughout this period, no one was advocating the prohibition of insider
loans-not even the Democrats.81 Senator Paul Sarbanes' reform bill in the
Senate-the Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 200282
-did not contain an anti-loan provision. And the Report of the Democratcontrolled Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued on July
8, 2002, contained only a recommendation that directors-not the Congressshould take steps to prevent excessive executive compensation, among other
things, by "barring the issuance of company-financed loans to directors and
senior officers of the company." 83 The proposal was intended to be exhortative, not mandatory.
D. Embarrassing Disclosures about President Bush
On the same day the Subcommittee's report was issued, Monday, July 8,
2002, President Bush held a "hastily-announced" press conference whose
purpose was to deflect questions about Bush's conduct while he was a director
at Harken Energy Corporation. 84 The press had resuscitated a story just days
before about the President's failure to file the required notice-of-sale
documents when he sold some Harken shares in 1990.85 According to one
observer, the press conference was a humiliating performance for Bush-"the
President ... looked [like] a very naughty boy indeed." 86 According to
another observer-this one a conservative Republican-"[h ]e just didn't seem
like he was prepared."87 His answers about Harken were "vague and
dismissive."88 It was "the weakest, most inarticulate showing he ha[d] made
since the early months of his presidency." 89
The next morning, Tuesday, July 9, 2002, President Bush appeared
before a gathering of some 850 business leaders in New York City, where he
announced his latest corporate reform initiatives. Promising "bold, well-

81. None of the Democrats' bills in the House had contained an anti-loan provision. Senator Carl
Levin (D-Mich.) introduced a bill that would require 8-K disclosure of any insider loan within 48 hours of
the making or forgiveness of the loan. See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, S. 2460, I 07th Congress (2002).
82. Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of2002, S. 2673, I 07th Congress (2002).
83. S. REP. No. 107-70, supra note 17, at4.
84. Elisabeth Bumiller & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Bush Defends Sale ofStock and Vows to Enhance
S.E.C., N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 2002, at At.
85. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Faces Scrutiny over Disclosing '90 Stock Sale Late, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 2002, at All.
86. Hendrik Hertzberg, Street Smarts, NEW YORKER, July 22, 2002, at 23.
87. David L. Greene, Scandals Present Dilemma for Bush: President Warns Firms Against Fraud
and Goes on Defensive about His Past; Seen as Potential Election Issue, BALT. SUN, July 14, 2002, at lA
(quoting Michael Franc, vice president for governmental relations at the Heritage Foundation).
88. Bumiller & Oppel, supra note 84.
89. DavidS. Broder, Wobbly Words, WASH. POST, July 14,2002, at B7.
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considered reforrns,"90 the President announced the creation of the Corporate
Fraud Task Force and committed himself to increased penalties for securities
law violators. 91 One journalist noted:
[The President] handled the preliminaries with affable aplomb. But
the text itself he read in a joyless monotone, without inflection or
conviction. The remedies he outlined were the feeblest he could
afford to offer. He made no mention of such obvious steps as making
corporations count stock options as an expense and preventing
accounting firms from doubling as consultants to companies they
audit. Some of his proposals (like requiring that a dishonest executive
be convicted in criminal court before being barred from future service
as an officer or a director of a public company) were weaker versions
of measures that have been recommended by the S.E.C.' s professional
staff or that are currently being rushed through Congress. Others (like
calling for annual reports to describe a C.E.O. 's "compensation
package" in plain English) are purely voluntary and therefore close to
meaningless. The main emphasis was on tougher-or tougher sounding-enforcement, notably a new "financial crimes SWAT team," an
additional hundred million dollars for the S.E.C., and more prison
time for wire and mail fraud. Even in this there was less than met the
ear. The SWAT team will be essentially an information clearing
house, and will involve no new net resources. The extra hundred
million for the S.E.C. may be more than the increase that was called
for in the President's last budget (i.e., zero), but it's barely a third of
what Senate Democrats are proposing.92
The President also spoke briefly on the subject of loans. He proposed the
immediate cessation of insider loans, as a matter of corporate policy, not as a
matter of federal law. Specifically, the President said "I challenge
compensation committees to put an end to all company loans to corporate
officers."93 According to his Director of Communications, Dan Bartlett,
"President Bush looked at these loans, and the president felt the best way to
do it was to draw a bright line; the best way to handle these loans going
forward is through a bank. " 94

90. Press Release, Office of White House Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on Corporate
Responsibility (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207094.html.
91. /d.
92. Hertzberg, supra note 86, at 23.
93. Press Release, supra note 90.
94. Jeff Gerth & Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Calls for End to Loans ofa Type He Once Received,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at AI.
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Then, the first of two critical events occurred. On Wednesday, July 10,
just one day after the President's Wall Street appearance, the Wall Street
Journal broke the story that "Mr. Bush himself [had] borrowed money from
Harken Energy Corp. while a company director and consultant there."95 "As
of March 20, 1990, he [had] owed $180,375, according to Harken Energy's
1989 annual report." 96
The next day, Thursday, July 11, both the New York Times and
Washington Post also reported on the below-market-rate loans.97 The international press characterized this news as "further embarrassment" for the
President98 and "the latest skeleton to emerge from Mr. Bush's Harken cupboard.''99 The domestic press, too, focused critically on the President's previous business behavior. 100 Suddenly, corporate scandals-and the President's
behavior-was seen as a threat to Republicans' chances for re-election.
Senate Republicans began to soften their resistance to meaningful reform. 101

E. Senator Schumer Weighs In
On Friday, July 12,2002, the second critical event in this story occurred.
Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-N. Y), who had been present at the President's
July 9 speech in New York City, introduced an amendment to the thenpending Senate reform bill (the Sarbanes bill) to outlaw insider loans. 102
(Until that moment, the Sarbanes bill had merely required that public

95. Joann S. Lublin, Loans to Corporate Officers Unlikely to Cease Soon, WAIL ST. J ., July 10,
2002, at A8.
96. /d.
97. Gerth & Stevenson, supra note 94, at A1; Mike Allen, Bush Took Oil Firm's Loans as Director:
Practice Would Be Banned in President's New Corporate Abuse Policy, WASH. POST, July II, 2002, at
AI.
98. Lydia Adetunji, Bush Faces Embarrassment Over Loans: Harken Energy White House

Confirms President Received Money from Houston-Based Oil Group to Buy Shares in Compaq, FIN.
TIMEs, July 12, 2002, at 9.
99. Rupert Cornwell, Bush Received Loans He Now Wants Banned, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
July 12, 2002, at 13.
100. See Michael Kranish & John Aloysius Farrell, Bush's Business Career-A Study in Using
Connections-Critics Look Anew at Bush's Dealings, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 2002, at A1; Ron Scherer,
Growing Scrutiny of Bush Business Record, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., July 12, 2002, at 2; Jim Landers & G.
Robert Hillman, Harken Deal Puts Pressure on Bush: Some Say Reluctance to Yield Records Hurting
Corporate Crackdown, Aide Decries Politics, DAU.AS MORNING NEWS, July 12, 2002, at lA.
101. See Alison Mitchell, A New (Election Year) Vigilance on Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2002, at Cl (noting the Republicans' about-face on many corporate reform issues and observing that
suddenly, proposed Senate legislation was "becoming tougher by the hour").
102. This amendment was one of only three amendments to the Sarbanes bill that was permitted to
go to the floor. "Senate staffers made clear that the uproar over Bush's loans from Harken ensured that the
Schumer proposal went to the front of the line." David Ivanovich, Senate Targets Execs' Loans: Ban on
Aid from Companies OK'd, HOUSTONCHRON., July 13, 2002, at Al.
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companies disclose all insider loans). 103 In advancing his amendment, Senator
Schumer noted that he had secured the support of the White House before
submitting the amendment. He said:
Madam President, I am going to be very brief because I know we
do not have too much time and we have other business. I thank both
the majority and minority managers, Senator Sarbanes and Senator
Gramm, for their work on this amendment. I have also spoken to
people in the White House who were supportive of this amendment.
It is a very simple amendment. It basically says that with certain
narrow exceptions, CEOs and CFOs of companies will not be able to
get loans from those companies.
The question is: Why can't these super rich corporate executives
go to the comer bank, the Sun Trust's or Bank of America's, like
everyone else to take loans? 104
With no discussion, the amendment then passed on a voice vote. 105 And
on Monday, July 15, 2002, the Senate unanimously passed out the Sarbanes
bill, including Senator Schumer's anti-loan amendment. 106 As Senator
Schumer conceded at the time, his amendment "never would have passed two
weeks ago." 107 Indeed, just five days before passage of the bill, the Wall
Street Journal had declared insider loans "too popular to disappear anytime
soon.'' 108

F. Getting the Deal Done
The White House immediately began applying pressure to House
Republicans to work to achieve a compromise between the (less aggressive)
House version of the reform bill and the (more aggressive) Senate version.
President Bush urged the players to reach agreement quickly: "The two

103. Kathryn Stewart Lehman, Recent Development, Executive Compensation Following the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 81 N.C. L. REv. 2115,2117 (2003).
104. 148 CONG. REC. S6690 (daily ed. July 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Schumer). In the press
release from his office, he asked a similar question: "Why do executives at Adelphia, Enron and WorldCom
need to borrow money from their stockholders? Why can't they go to the bank like everybody else?" Press
Release, Office of Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), Schumer Efforts to Crack Down on Cheating
Corporations Pass Senate (July 12, 2002) (on file with author).
105. 148 CONG. REC. S 6690 (daily ed. July 12, 2002).
106. Shailagh Murray, Bill Overhauling Audit Regulation Passes in Senate, WAIL ST. J., July 16,
2002, at A3.
107. Jerry Zremski, Bill OK'd to Prohibit Loans to Executives, BUFFALO NEWS, July 13,2002, at AI.
108. Joann S. Lublin, Questioning the Books: The President Speaks: Loans to Corporate Officers
Unlikely to Cease Soon, WAIL ST. J., July 10,2002, at AS .
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[chambers] need to get together as quickly as possible and get me a bill that
I can sign before the August recess," 109 he said. In response, the House
quickly passed a bill that would increase the penalties for economic crimes.
While the Senate bill passed just the day before had set a maximum penalty
of 10 years in prison, the new House bill set the maximum at 25 years. 110 This
signaled a significant change of heart-described by one commentator as a
"death bed conversion" 111 -among House Republicans since the House bill
had passed on April24. As Senator Sarbanes noted, "[w ]hen the House acted
three months ago, we did not yet know the full depth and extent of the
problems." 112
Between July 16 and July 25, the Senate and House conferees, in consultation with the White House, worked to reach an acceptable compromise.
Since the first of July, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had fallen 1000
points, and public opinion polls increasingly echoed the public's concern over
corporate scandals. 113 On Friday, July 12, the Office and Management and
Budget had announced that, instead of running a small surplus in FY 2002, the
government now expected a deficit of $165 billion. 114 Suddenly, it became
obvious to even the toughest of Republicans-including those in the White
House who were leery of the Sarbanes bill-that the free-market ideologues
would have to give way.
"We've got to look out for ourselves first and foremost," a top House
Republican strategist told The Washington Post. "We have to go home in a
week and say we've done something. People have to wake up and realize the
political nature of this fight."
In a report distributed on Capitol Hill, a prominent Republican polling
frrm found that "the bottom has fallen out on the mood of the country." In the
pollsters' view, "WorldCom's [bankruptcy] announcement may have been the
straw that broke the camel's back." It certainly broke the stock market's back.

109. Murray, supra note 106, at A3.
110. Shailagh Murray, House GOP Moves on Oversight Bill, with Few Changes, WALL ST. J. , July
19,2002, at A3.
Ill. Dierdre Sesgrean, Gephardt Stresses Economy at Cross-Country Stops, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Sept. 2, 2002, at AI.
112. Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Remarks of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee
on the Passage of the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of2002" (July 15,
2002), at www .senate.gov/-sarbanes/pages/press/071502_bill_passage.html.
113. See William Booth, Economic Anxiety Worries Politicians; As Elections Approach, Voters May
Be Looking for Someone to Blame, WASH. POST, July 21,2002, at AI (citing polling data showing that 35
percent of respondents in July listed the economy as the nation's most important issue, compared with 24
percent a month earlier).
114. Richard W. Stevenson, White House Says It Expects Deficit to Hit $165 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2002, at AI.
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"Voters' attitudes toward corporate offenders are hostile," the report warned.
"Legislation punishing wrongdoers can't be too tough." 115
According to one Republican member of Congress,
By the time it got to conference, Republicans were under instructions
from the speaker of the House and most political operatives to get a
bill and get it now. There was a mad dash to embrace the Sarbanes
bill. They didn't want to get into a fight where Republicans were
arguing for a weaker bill. None of the troops in the House were
prepared to support that effort. 116
At this point, even protectionist lobbying faltered. Where once the
lobbyists had counted on a stalemate between the House and the Senate,
deferring a vote at least until 2003, 117 now they scrambled to carve out just "a
few strategic changes" in the Sarbanes bill. 118 "'The enormity of pressure to
get this done before the weekend suggests anyone like me had better narrow
down the scope of things they're going to try to influence,' said Bruce Josten,
the Chamber of Commerce's chief lobbyist." 119
Finally, on Thursday, July 25, 2002, a deal having been hanunered out,
a consensus bill based on the Sarbanes bill passed overwhelmingly in both
chambers. 120 The vote in the House was 422-3; the Senate passed it by 99-0.
Loan prohibition was part of the package. The President signed it into law on
Tuesday, July 30, 2002.
IV. THE DELffiERATIVENESS NORM IN THE SENATE

Legislation in the United States is ideally described as having three
salient characteristics: "deliberativeness, representativeness, and accessibility."121 The key word here for our purposes is "deliberativeness." In a
perfect world, legislation is the product of a process that involves the
balancing of competing views, considerations of numerous alternatives, and
above all, time during which important ideas can percolate.

115. William Schneider, Big Business Loses Its Protector, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2002, at Ml.
116. Carolyn Lochhead, Bush to Sign Corporate Crackdown: GOP Drops Opposition, Backs
Tougher Version, S. F. CHRON., July 25, 2002, at AI (quoting Rep. George Miller (R-Cal.)).
117. See Jonathan Weisman, Lobbyists Lose Clout; Business Groups Find Their Influence on Audit
Refonn Legislation Shrinking, WASH. POST, July 23, 2002, at Al.
118. /d.
119. /d.
120. Richard B. Schmitt et al., Corporate-Oversight Bill Passes, Eases Path for Investor Lawsuits,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at Al.
121. ABNER J. MIKV A & ERIC LANE, AN lNTRODUcriON TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 69 (1997).
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The entire structure of the Congress encourages deliberativeness in the
development of federal legislation. Recall that the framers of the Constitution
built many speed-bumps into the legislative process-two houses of Congress, 122 the Presidential veto, 123 and supermajorities in both houses for a veto
override. 124 They also created incentives for robust "speech and debate." 125
The origins of the notion that legislation is legitimate only where it is the
product of a deliberative process traces (at a minimum) to the Federalist
Papers. Federalist 63 expressed concern that, left unchecked, any legislative
body "[might] be warped by strong passions or momentary interest." 126
Federalist 62 advocated a Senate with longer terms than the House, in part for
the sake of continuity, but in part because of a concern that members of the
House, "if left wholly to themselves, [might make] a variety of important
errors in the exercise of their legislative trust." 127
The importance of a deliberative process focused particularly on the
Senate:
Most popular histories of Congress include an exchange, very likely
apocryphal, in which Washington and Jefferson discuss the difference
between the House and Senate. "Why did you pour that coffee into
your saucer?" Washington asks. "To cool it," Jefferson replies.
"Even so," Washington says, "we pour legislation into the senatorial
saucer to cool it." 128
We also see adherence to the deliberativeness norm in the Senate today.
Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) has described the Senate as "[a place where]
you can always slow things down ...." 129
Thus it is a surprise when the Senate acts precipitously, as it did in the
case of the anti-loan provision. The lack of deliberativeness on this, and other
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was both atypical and, in terms of

122. U.S. CONST. art. L § I.
123. U.S. CONST. art. L § 7, cl. 2.
124. /d.
125. u.s. CONST. art. L § 6, cl. l.
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison).
127. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison). See also Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the AltarofAppropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 457,
495-98 (1997):
Indeed, the bicameral system established by the Founders and encapsulated in the
Constitution was a response to the concern that a hasty and potentially tyrannical majority
in the House of Representatives would act "too quickly and chaotically" if left to its own
devices; the Senate, an indirectly elected upper house, would "use reason and judgment to
temper the lower house's expected haste and extremism.
128. Jeffrey Toobin, Blowing up the Senate, NEW YOR~R. Mar. 7, 2005, at 42.
129. /d.
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public policy, regrettable. Why? First, deliberativeness fosters incrementalism rather than abrupt or sweeping change. Second, deliberativeness ensures
that all voices-informed or otherwise-may be heard.
Deliberativeness is not a synonym for debate, although debate may be
one of its elements. Rather the term defines those steps of the
legislative process that slow legislative decision-making and distance
it from the passions and immediacy of the prevailing desires of
individual legislators and of various constituencies. Deliberativeness ·
is intended as an anchor against change, protecting the status quo
from precipitous upset. ... Affirmatively, deliberativeness works
toward assuring that enacted legislation is based on a public consensus on the need for, as well as the type of, change. 130
Adherence to the deliberativeness norm typically means that time must
be spent ascertaining other legislators' values, considering alternatives,
receiving input from constituents and various interest groups, and forging a
genuine consensus. As much as deliberativeness was important in the 1780s,
it is even more so now, given our polarized national values and an increasingly
diverse electorate. In such a setting, says Eric Lane, legislators must often
slow down to consider competing ideas and values beyond the immediate
issue or their personal experience:
[l]egislators ... must consider an array of factors in arriving at their
decisions, including: the views of their colleagues and constituents,
the historical setting for the proposal; the impact on other regulatory
or redistributive schemes; and internal politics. 131
None of these items had time to surface in the minutes between introduction
and passage of the anti-loan provision.
Critics, of course, have recognized many exceptions to the deliberativeness norm. Spending limitation riders, 132 so-called "Christmas tree" legislation, 133 and the appropriations process itself134 all elude the type of measured

130. Mikva & Lane, supra note 121, at 677.
131. Eric Lane, Essay, Men Are Not Angels: The Realpolitik ofDirect Democracy and What We Can
Do About It, 34 Wll.LAME'ITE L. REv. 579, 594 (1998).
132. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987
DUKE L. J. 456 (1987) (criticizing the use of spending limits or threatened budget cuts as a means of
shaping policy without adequate public input).
133. See Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Rider: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 957,971,998 (describing the process by which members of Congress
trade favors and add special interest provisions to a "must-pass" bill at the last minute).
134. Devins, supra note 132, at 458 ("appropriations are often acted on quickly, providing little
opportunity for thoughtful deliberation of the issues raised by such measures."). See also Michelle V.
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deliberation that serious legislation deserves. Still, these devices are "not a
favored vehicle for public policymaking in a representative democracy." 135
V. WHAT DELIBERATIVENESS MIGHT HAVE REVEALED

We know from the legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that
Congress did not deliberate at all about the anti-loan provision. As a thought
exercise, however, let us assume that the provision had been proposed in, say,
March, 2002. Indeed, let us assume that President Bush had made statutory
loan prohibition one of the elements of his corporate governance reform
proposal in March, 2002. What might a thoughtful Congressional inquiry
have revealed?
First, as a backdrop, it would have been clear that, after a rich and fitful
history, 136 corporate loans in 2002 were treated in four different ways,
depending on a company's state of incorporation: (1) some states prohibited
insider loans; 137 (2) some states required specific procedures for the approval
of insider loans; 138 (3) 29 states, including Delaware, permitted insider loans
only where the board (at least in theory) could identify a corporate benefit
from making the loan; 139 and (4) 19 states, following the most recent version
of the Model Business Corporation Act, had totally deregulated insider loans.
Of the eight "problem companies" whose stories led up to enactment of the
anti-loan provision, three-WorldCom, Tyco, and Global Crossing-were
incorporated in a "deregulated" jurisdiction. 140 This evidence might have

Lacko, Comment, The Data Quality Act, Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy?, 53 EMORY L. J. 305, 305
(2004) (describing an appropriations rider as "a figurative needle in the haystack ofa voluminous document
detailing the federal government's budgetary allocations for [the coming fiscal year]"); Sidney A. Shapiro,
The Information Quality Act and Environmental Protection: The Perils ojRejonn by Appropriations Rider,
28 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y REv. 339, 339 (2004) (characterizing important legislation as having
been "hidden in a few paragraphs of a very large appropriations bill").
135. Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Rejonn, 31 WAKE
FORESTL. REv. 587,642 (1996).
136. See Barnard, supra note 14, at 240-50 (tracing history).
137. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE§ 30-3-82 (Michie 2004).
138. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE§ 315 (West 2005) (requiring shareholder approval of loans to
directors, or for corporations with 100 or more shareholders, requiring shareholder approval of a bylaw
authorizing loans); S.D. CODIFIED LAws§ 47-2-65 (Michie 2003) (requiring shareholder approval ofloans
to directors).
139. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (2005) (permitting loans to officers and directors,
"whenever, in the judgment of the directors, such loan, guaranty or assistance may reasonably be expected
to benefit the corporation"); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 607.0833 (West 2005).
140. WorldCom was incorporated in Georgia. Tyco and Global Crossing were incorporated in
Bermuda. Quite apart from anti-loan sentiment, the offshore incorporation ofTyco and Global Crossing
was a subject of widespread condemnation. See Christopher Lee, Companies That Relocate to Avoid
Income Taxes Come Under Fire, DAlLAS MORNING NEWS, July 14, 2002, at 15A (discussing proposed
legislation to punish offshore companies).
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suggested that unwise and permissive state laws had played some role in the
growth and abuse of insider loans.
Second, it would have been clear that the use of insider loans had
burgeoned during the 1990s, in part due to the "arms race" of executive
compensation during that period, and in part due to some quirks of the federal
income tax law. (Specifically, receiving a loan rather than a direct cash
payment permits an executive to avoid short-term income tax obligations.) As
of 2002, "more than one-third of the largest publicly traded corporations [had
entered] into over $4 billion in low interest loan agreements with [their]
corporate executives." 141
Third, it would have been clear that the nature and magnitude of insider
loans had changed dramatically since the 1980s. For example, the
descriptions of insider loans in a 1988 study included simple cash advances
against salary, loans made to purchase life insurance, loans made to purchase
a new house, loans made to purchase stock, loans made to facilitate the
exercise of stock options, and "expense advances." 142 The amounts involved
ranged from less than $5000 to $2.5 million. 143 In contrast, by 2002, insider
loans often ran into the tens of millions of dollars. One study of these loans
found the mean amount for loans made to facilitate the purchase of company
shares alone to be $2.5 million. 144
Fourth, it might have been possible for the Congressional staff to do
some empirical data-gathering to see if insider loans were associated disproportionately with failing companies or were spread more broadly across the
market. I did a shirttail version of such a study in the spring of 2003. Looking
at the 50 public companies identified by Business Week as the "Best Performers" of 2002, 145 I found that 10 of them, or 20% of the total, reported
having made or retained insider loans to their officers and directors during the
preceding year. Then, looking at the 195 public companies that entered

141. McClendon, supra note II, at 998. (Other consultants' studies reported different numbers, but
all agreed that the trend of making insider loans was strongly upward.). See Joann S. Lublin, Loan
Dangers: Companies Are Having Second Thoughts About Lending Money to Their Top Executives, WALL
ST. J., April12, 2001, at R6 ("Nearly 14% of214 major public companies extended credit for executive
officers' stock purchases in 1999, up from 8.4% in 1994, according to a proxy-statement analysis by New
York compensation consultants William M. Mercer Inc."); Joann S. Lublin, Loans to Corporate Officers
Unlikely to Cease Soon, WAU. ST. J., July 10, 2002, at A8 ("About 412 of 1,000 U.S. corporations lent
money to certain top executives from 1991 to 2000-up from the 225 doing so in 1981 to 1990, concludes
an analysis by consultants Executive Compensation Advisory Services in Alexandria, Va.").
142. Barnard, supra note 14, app. D.
143. ld.
144. Khuldeep Shastri & Kathleen M. Kahle, Executive Loans, in AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings:
EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper No. 184, at 10, Feb. 2003, at http://ssm.com/abstract=423447.
145. The Best Performers, Bus. WEEK, Special Annual Issue, Spring 2003.
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Chapter 11 in 2002, 146 I found that 49 of them, or 25% of the total, reported
having made or retained insider loans during the preceding year. These
findings suggest that companies regarded as "winners" were just about as
likely to have made an insider loan as companies regarded as "losers."
With a little more time, empirical data-gathering might have revealed
additional important facts. Two studies published some months after enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act examined insider loans using rigorous
methods. One study detailed the use of insider loans from 1996-2000 and concluded that loans made to facilitate stock purchases were often diverted to
other uses. 147 Another study found a "strong negative relationship between
industry-adjusted returns and [the presence of insider] loans." 148
Fifth, Congressional hearings-and a thoughtful analysis of the data
presented-might have reinforced the recognition that not all insider loans
were harmful, or even suspect. Hundreds of such loans each year were repaid
in full by the borrowers, or were being repaid over time pursuant to a
repayment schedule. Other loans were made in small amounts, or to facilitate
desirable corporate transactions. Many insider loans facilitated the purchase
of company shares, which scholars have argued is a desirable method of
aligning management's interests with those of shareholders. 149 Many of these
loans, in short, were totally harmless and/or advanced a legitimate corporate
purpose.
With time, it would have been possible-and it still is possible-to
consider insider loans along six dimensions: (1) the terms of the loan; (2) the
purpose for the loan; (3) the size of the loan; (4) the company's expectations
for repayment of the loan; (5) the manner of approval of the loan; and (6)
whether or not the loan was adequately disclosed to investors.
A. Terms of the loan

Insider loans may be categorized by their terms. These range from fullycompetitive market terms (including interest rate, duration of the loan, and
covenants) of the sort that a borrower could negotiate from a bank or finance
company to fully uncompetitive (non-interest bearing, indefinite term,
unsecured) loans of the sort that a legitimate bank would never make.

146. The identity of these companies was provided by BankruptcyData.com research.
147. Shastri & Kahle, supra note 144, at 25.
148. Elizabeth A. Gordon et al., Related Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate
Governance and Finn Value, in EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4377, at 6, Aug. 2004, at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=558983.
149. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, The Duty ofCare, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN.
L. REv. 649, 695 (1995) (suggesting that directors be paid primarily in stock rather than cash, because
doing so aligns their interests with that of shareholders).
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B. Purpose of the loan
Loans may represent purposes intrinsic to the corporation's business
(such as loans made to facilitate executive relocation) or involving some form
of reward for executive performance (loans made to facilitate the "cashless"
exercise of stock options). They may also include more generalized forms of
incentives (short-term loans made to facilitate the purchase of life insurance)
or they may advance a purpose that is, frankly, not even vaguely related to the
corporation's business (loans, such as those made to Bernie Ebbers, made to
facilitate outside investments).

C. Size of the loan
Loans may be measured by the amount of money involved. Loans that
are proportionate to the borrower's base salary (such as travel advances or
modest relocation loans) are at one end of this spectrum and multimillion
dollar loans far in excess of the borrower's base salary are at the other.

D. Expectation of repayment
Insider loans may also be categorized by the company's expectations for
repayment. In most cases, the expectation is for complete repayment pursuant
to the terms of the loan, whatever those terms might include. In other cases,
repayment may be nominally expected, but may also be forgiven if certain
events occur. 150 In still other cases, there is the wholly illusory loan for which
no repayment is expected. Such loans, according to the IRS, should be treated
as straight compensation. 151
E. Manner of approval

There is yet a fifth dimension to insider loans, having to do with the
manner in which the loan is approved. This ranges from thoughtful authorization by disinterested members of the board of directors (in possession of full
information), to a casual rubber stamp by the board, to outright misappropriation by the borrower without authorization by or notice to the board.
(Significantly, this last type of transaction is not really a loan at all).

150. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Big Perks Put Seven CEOs in a Whole "Other" Club, L.A. TIMEs,
June 6, 2004, at C4 (describing the "golden hello" given the new CEO ofMattel, Inc. in 2000, when he was
given a $5.5 million loan "with an agreement to erase the debt if he lasted three years on the job"); In re
Integrated Health Servs., 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 100 (D. Del.) (noting that the CEO of the company had been
given a $34.5 million loan, which would be "forgiven over time according to a set formula") .
15l. See Joseph E. Bachelder Ill, Tax Treatment of Loans to Executives, 2001 HoT IsSUES IN
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, 719 (describing IRS treatment of some executive loans as compensation).
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F. Disclosure
The sixth dimension for assessing an insider loan has to do with how and
to what extent the loan r~lationship is disclosed to investors. Some loans of
the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period were fully disclosed and carefully described
in public filings. 152 Others were alluded to somewhere, though often buried
in a footnote to the financial statements, rather than described in plain English
in the compensation section of the document. 153 Others were not disclosed
at all.154
As shown below, by plotting these considerations graphically, it would
have been easy to see that some types of insider loans-those described in
Column #1-were likely to be entirely legitimate exercises of business judgment which would present no problems to the integrity of the market. Other
loans-those described in Column #2-might be more questionable and might
require some legislative response. But only the "Column #3" loans would be
the sort of loans for which federal prohibition might be appropriate.

Terms

Column #1
Bank-like terms

Purpose

Key to a corporate
objective

Magnitude
Repayment
Approval

Proportionate to salary
Intent to collect
Advance approval by
disinterested members
of the board

Disclosure

Fully disclosed

Column #2
Below-market
interest rates, etc.
Indirectly supportive
of a corporate
objective
Generous
Pro forma approval
after the loan is
disbursed
Obfuscated

Column #3
"Sweetheart" terms
(No-interest loans)
Unrelated to any
corporate goals
Outlandish
Intent to forgive
Funds are
misappropriated
without notice to the
board
Undisclosed

Finally, had they been given the opportunity to do so, Congressional
staffers might have developed one additional set of data. An important study
published after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley suggests that insider loans were

152. See, e.g., Conseco, Inc,. Proxy Statement, Apr. 30,2001, at 16-17 ("Certain Relationships and
Related Transactions"); Comdisco, Inc., Proxy Statement, Dec. 29, 2000, at 15 ("Comdisco Executive
Officer Compensation and Benefits").
153. See, e.g., Microsoft's Failure to Disclose Loan May Be a Violation of the lAw, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 10, 2002, at B I (noting that a $15 million loan to the company's chief operating officer was disclosed
in a footnote, though in impenetrable terms that did not include the word "loan").
154. Apparently, the loans at Tyco were not included in the firm's public filings. Ben White, Tyco
Repons Paints Picture of Greed: CEO Kozlowski Allegedly Deceived Firm's Board, WASH. POST, Sept.
17, 2001 , at El.
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only one of several value-reducing practices at public companies in 20002001. 155 Other types of "related party transactions" occurred more than three
times as often as insider loans. As Mark Lowenstein has pointed out,
"[w]hether [insider] loans were the most abused form of compensation, and
thus a logical place for Congress to start, is questionable." 156
Here's the bottom line: had Congress in the spring of2002 taken a hard
look at the universe of insider loans (or even a quick look), it would have
identified several alternatives to a statutory prohibition of insider loans at
public companies. These included, in ascending order of invasiveness: (1)
enforcing existing disclosure laws so as to discourage the making of "Column
#3" -type loans; (2) toughening the disclosure laws by federal statute or regulation to capture more fully the problems of "Column #3"-type loans; (3)
imposing new federal regulations on insider loans-such as mandating preapproval or collection procedures-in addition to the existing disclosure
requirements; (4) prohibiting certain types of "Column #3"-type loans (for
example, non-interest bearing loans or loans in an amount of more than 20%
of the executive's annual base pay); and (5) prohibiting insider loans with
specific undesirable characteristics. 157 Some or all of these approaches might
well have made more sense than the "death penalty" approach that Congress
ultimately selected.
VI. OPPORTUNISM AND IMAGERY
There is much one might say about successful politicians. They are typically gregarious; need little sleep; can tolerate endless, repetitive encounters
with strangers; and are often quick to identify "signature" issues with which
to enhance their public visibility. Good politicians know the value of language, too. 158 Not only do they perfect the art of the "sound bite," they also seize

155. Gordon et al., supra note 148, at 51.
156. Mark J. Lowenstein, The Quiet TransfontUltion of Corporate Law, 51 SMU L. REv. 353, 361
(2004).

157. All these proposals assume that federal, rather than state, action is the most appropriate locus
of reform. It would also have been possible to identify several reform items at the state level, i.e, (l)
requiring specific approval procedures for all insider loans as a matter of state law; (2) requiring specific
terms and collection procedures for all insider loans as a matter of state law; (3) penalizing ''Column #3"
loans both by state statute and state decisional law; and (4) prohibiting ''Column #3" loans.
158. See John Comer & Dick Pels, The Re-Styling of Politics, in MEDIA AND THE REsTYLING OF
PoLmcs (2003) at 11 ("Finding the 'right' kind of language to address particular audiences on specific
topics is among the primary challenges to those seeking and holding political office").
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upon powerful imagery in the bills they introduce 159 and the campaign slogans
they use in their campaigns. 160
Senator Chuck Schumer is a very successful politician. In his most
recent re-election campaign in November, 2004, he received over 70% of the
vote. 161
There are many reasons Senator Schumer is successful. According to
one Democratic consultant, "[n]o one works harder. He travels incessantly.
He's well-liked upstate. He understands the value of money in politics. He
is the consummate politician." 162
But there is more to Senator Schumer's success than hard work and wellhoned skills. Senator Schumer "has distinguished himself by his persistent
cultivation of media attention for populist-style fights." 163 This instinct for a
popular issue, coupled with his ability to command media attention at
precisely the right moment in the news cycle, both contributed to Senator
Schumer's embrace of the anti-loan provision.
Vll. CONRJSION AND REGRET
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, confusion has arisen on a
number of issues arguably governed by the anti-loan provision. For example,
what is the relationship between the anti-loan provision and state indemnification laws that permit the advancement of attorneys' fees and expenses? Is
it possible that the (routine) practice of advancing legal fees to officers and
directors to defend lawsuits against them may now constitute an unlawful loan
in violation of the anti-loan provision? 164
Or, what is the impact of the anti-loan provision on the practice of
facilitating arrangements by which executives can easily exercise their accu-

159. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
160. See, e.g. Presidential Campaign Slogans, at http://www.presidentsusa.net/campaignslogans
.html ("Putting People First" (William Clinton); "A Leader, for a Change" (Jimmy Carter); and "Reformer
With Results" (George W. Bush)).
161. Michael Slackman, Schumer Wins, and the Speculation Grows, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 2004, at
P2.
162. Dionne Searcey, Schumer Looking Ahead: Confident in His Bidfor Re-election, the Incumbent
Senator May Have Sights Set on Gubernatorial Race, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 2004, at A20 (quoting
Democratic consultant Hank Sheinkopf).
163. Mike Doming & Rick Pearson, Blagojevich Finds Role Model: N.Y. Senator's Ways Followed,
CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2004, at C I.
164. Sean Carnathan, Will the Company Cover an Ex-Officer's Legal Costs? The New World of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 13 Bus. LAW TODAY 33 (2003).
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mulated stock options? When officers or directors engage in a "cashless
exerciseH of their options-an exercise of the options followed by an
immediate sale of some portion of the stock to cover the exercise price-is
that a violation of the anti-loan provision? 165
Or, what is the impact of the anti-loan provision on the once-common
practice of purchasing so-called "split-dollar" life insurance coverage for
senior-level executives? When a company pays the premium for a life
insurance policy that is later reimbursed by the executive when she retires (for
a while, this was a tax-favored strategy), is that a violation of the anti-loan
provision ?166
In the immediate aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley' s passage, these and other
questions quickly surfaced. 167 Practitioners were hard-pressed to give useful
advice to their clients, and often conflicting advice was the result. 168 The
insurance industry sought interpretive guidance from the SEC, 169 which the
Commission refused to supply. 170 It also sought assistance and corrective
legislation from Congress, which the Congressmen, too, refused to supply. 171
Then, something remarkable happened. Lacking any useful guidance
from the SEC or from Congress, a self-appointed group of lawyers from
twenty-five law firms across the country decided to draft their own guidance
document. 172 Though this project has been criticized as a possible violation

165. Robert A. Barron, Has Sarbanes-Oxley Killed the Broker-Assisted Cashless Exercisefor Section
I6 Insiders?, 30 SEC. REG. L. J. 440, 487 (Winter 2002); John T. Bostelman et al., Cashless Exercise,
Indemnification, and Other Permissible Activities Under Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, THE
CORP. Gov. ADVISOR, Nov/Dec. 2002, at 26.
166. See Jeremy Kahn, Suddenly Some Perks Aren't Worth the Pain, FORTIJNE, Nov. 11, 2002, at
40 (noting that both the law's sponsors, Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman Michael Oxley, "never
intended to bar split-dollar insurance policies," but that most companies had ceased to provide them).
167. Martin E. Lybecker et al., Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Devil May Have Been
the Draftsman, WAU ST. LAWYER, Oct. 2002, at 1.
168. See Sarbanes-Oxley Should Not Preclude All Broker-Assisted Cashless Option Exercises by
Insiders, at http://www.reedsmith.comllibrary/publicationView.cfm?itemid=3744 (noting that "[a]lthough
some law firms have advised public issuers to suspend broker-assisted cashless stock option exercises for
executive officers and directors in light of Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we believe, subject to
certain limitations, that such suspension is not necessary'').
169. See Industry Battling Multiple Reverses on Split-Dollar, COU Life Sector Products, INS.
CHRON., Sept. 2, 2002 (noting that the insurance industry was seeking an SEC interpretation of the antiloan provision that would exempt split-dollar insurance products from its coverage).
170. Lybecker et al., supra note 167, at 1 ("[S]enior members of the [SEC] staff have made it clear
that the Commission is not likely to issue any interpretive guidance regarding [the anti-loan provision] (at
last not in the near future, and that they expect members of the practicing bar to resolve the questions").
171. See Split-Dollar Fix Eyed on Pension Bill, INs. CHRON, Sept. 9, 2002 (noting lobbyists' efforts
to secure statutory protection for split-dollar life insurance products); Hill Pressure Threatens Split Dollar,
INs. CHRON., Sept. 30, 2002 (noting that the industry's efforts secure an exemption for split-dollar life
insurance products "appeared doomed to failure").
172. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Interpretive Issues Under§ 402-Prohibition of Certain Insider
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of the antitrust laws, 173 it was in fact an inspired act of self-preservation on the
lawyers' part. With no useful legislative history to guide them, and many
unanswered questions, the lawyers tried to craft a coherent interpretation of
the statute that would withstand judicial scrutiny and also permit critical
corporate transactions to go forward. Specifically, the document suggested
that routine travel advances and relocation loans should not be treated as
"personal loans." 174 It also encouraged certain types of retention loans" 175 and
suggested that the advancement of fees and expenses in litigated proceedings
should not be subject to the anti-loan provision. 176 "While the SEC didn't
sanction the memo, it didn't criticize it either, leading some lawyers to believe
their take on the [anti-loan provision] was correct." 177
Still, questions remained. One year after the statute was passed, Congressman Oxley expressed "trepidation" about the anti-loan provision "and
said he would like to see Congress clarify what it meant." 178 Senator Sarbanes
"[didn't] share Mr. Oxley's concems." 179 And both agreed it was still too
soon to make any legislative changes. 180
Ultimately, the SEC did provide some clarification as regards the legitimacy of foreign bank loans to bank executives. 181 And the Department of
Labor provided some clarification as regards the application of the anti-loan
provision to ERISA plans. 182 With those exceptions, however, there has been
no official clarification of the scope and reach of the anti-loan provision.
Thus, questions remain as to hundreds of millions of dollars in outstanding
loans to officers and directors. 183 Some of these loans are being forgiven
pursuant to pre-arranged schedules. Others are being paid off with the
passage of time.

Loans, at www.mayerbrown.com/sarbanesoxley/interpretiveissuesundersec402.pdf.
173. Mark R. Patterson, Law-Fixing: Should Lawyers Agree How to Interpret Statutes?, in Fordham
School of Law, PUB-LAW Research Papers No. 50, at 18-9, May 5, 2004,
at
http://ssm.com/abstract=555706.
174. Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Interpretive Issues Under§ 402-Prohibition of Certain Insider Loans,
supra note 172, at 3.
175. ld. at 4-5.
176. ld.
177. Deborah Solomon, Sarbanes and Oxley Agree to Disagree, WAll. ST. J., July 24, 2003, at Cl.
178. /d.
179. ld.
180. ld. ('They said corporate America needs more time to digest the rules before a final verdict on
the law's effectiveness can be reached and potential weaknesses spotted").
181. SEC Adopts Fund Disclosure Rules and Foreign Bank Loan Exemption; Proposes Shell
Company Rules, at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-50.htm.
182. Field Assistance Bulletin 2003-1, Aprill5, 2003.
183. Louis Lavelle, Executive Loans: A Long Good-Bye, Bus. WK., Feb. 2, 2004, at 12.
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VID. WHAT NEXT?

Some critics have decried the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as imposing "quack
corporate governance" rules on thousands ofU.S. public coinpanies. 184 Others
have faulted the Act for failing to disrupt the "social status quo" of U.S.
corporate hierarchies and boards of directors. 185 Still others have raised
federalism concerns, 186 worried that the Act just imposes more of the same
kind of regulations that failed to work in the past, 187 and lamented the Act's
impact on a dwindling pool of qualified corporate directors. 188 Executives
complain constantly about the difficulty of meeting the Act's requirements. 189
I am more optimistic about the Act as a whole than some of these critics,
but wary of some of the smaller pieces of the Act that were poured into it at
the last minute 190-"cobbled together" as one critic says 191-without the kind
of thought and deliberation we should reasonably expect of our lawmakers.
The anti-loan provision is one such piece.
So, what to do now? Roberta Romano has urged that the anti-loan
provision (along with several other provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) be
made a default rule which could be waived by individual corporations. 192
Others would suggest outright repeal.
I suggest two other alternatives. First, Congress should conduct a
thoughtful study of the three issues that have generated the most pressing
concerns among public company executives and their lawyers: advancement
of fees and expenses in derivative litigation, cashless exercise of stock

184. Romano, supra note 9, at 8.
185. James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles,
83 ORE. L. REv. 435,533 (2004).
186. Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 28 IOWAJ. CORP. L. 1,58 (2002); William B. Chandler ill & Leo E. Strine,
Jr. The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents ofOne Small State, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 953, 971-72 (2003)(describing Section 402 as "a type
of limitation that more traditional minds might think should flow from the chartering states, rather than
from the federal government").
187. Joan MacLeod Herninway, Enron's Tangled Web: Complex Relationships. Unanswered
Questions, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1167, 1182 (2003).
188. E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 Bus. LAw. 1447,
1452 (2004).
189. See, e.g., Ellen McCarthy & Carrie Johnson, Law Makes Company Account for Past Sins,
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2005, at El (quoting the CEO of BearingPoint Inc. concerning the burden of
complying with the Act).
190. See Ribstein, supra at 186, at 19 (noting that the Sarbanes-Ox1ey Act ''was passed in a hectic
environment in which politicians played on public misperceptions of risk and eschewed careful balancing
of costs and benefits").
191. Veasey, supra note 188, at 1451.
192. Romano, supra note 9, at 206.
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options, and split-dollar life insurance. 193 After careful study and public
hearings, specific amendments to the anti-loan provision might prove to be in
order, or not.
Second, Congress should consider a more global approach to the question
of insider loans and explore the possibility of re-authorizing such loans, with
a strong "corporate benefit" limitation.
A. Give Meaning to "Corporate Benefit"

As noted above, the current state of the law governing insider loans is
scattered-literally-all over the map. The statutory language in 29 states
limits insider loans to those circumstances where the board of directors can
affirmatively find that making the loan will provide a "benefit" to the
corporation. 194 The problem is that the states have developed almost no
useful guidance on what is meant by the term "corporate benefit." As noted
in my 1988 study, insider loans were often made without regard to this
statutory requirement. 195 And these loans were rarely subject to litigation,
because most of them were repaid.
When issues relating to abusive insider loans were presented in litigation,
moreover, the question of whether the statutory requirement of a "corporate
benefit" had been met, was often not raised or decided. Thus, in Aronson v.
Lewis, 196 the question of whether $225,000 in interest-free loans to a director
had been properly approved by the board under Delaware law was never
considered, because the plaintiffs failed to meet the demand requirement. And
in Technicorp International v. Johnston, 197 a challenge to $6 million in
interest-free loans was subsumed in a much larger case involving outright
looting of the corporation. 198 In Integrated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins, 199
the question was whether the plaintiff had properly alleged that the grant and
later forgiveness of several loans to the CEO was the product of a "conscious
and intentional disregard" of the directors' fiduciary duties as defined in the
Disney case. 200 (The court concluded that, with respect to some of the loans,

193. The split-dollar life insurance issue may be less pressing than the other two, since some of the
advantages of such plans have been reduced since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Joseph B.
Treaster, New Treasury Rule Taxes Some Insurance Policies, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12,2003, at C5.
194. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
195. Barnard, supra note 14, at 254.
196. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
197. Technicorp lnt'l ll, Inc. v. Johnston, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81 (Del. Ch. 2000).
198. The court characterized the defendants' conduct in that case as a "pattern of massive fraudulent
diversions of [the corporation's] assets and concealment of the same." /d.
199. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, 2004 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 122 (Del. Ch. 2004).
200. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
tax
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the answer was "yes.") So, even in Delaware, there has been little useful guidance on which loans are likely to satisfy the "corporate benefit" requirement.
Insider loans have sometimes surfaced in bankruptcy cases, but there the
question has been whether the loans should be treated as fraudulent
conveyances with respect to the corporation's creditors, and not whether the
loans have passed the "corporate benefit" test. 201 Similar issues are occasionally found in federal income tax cases, where the issue is typically whether the
insider loan was actually a loan or whether in fact it represented taxable
compensation202 or a constructive dividend. 203 Sometimes, insider loans play
a role in decisions to pierce the corporate veil. 204
Only a handful of cases, however, have ever addressed the issue of
"corporate benefit" directly, and even those that have done so, have done so
inadequately.205 Significantly, since 1988, I have found only two cases in
which insider loans have been challenged on their merits.206
So, Congress might consider adopting a federal provision, applicable to
public companies, that would compel corporate boards to make a specific
finding that any insider loan is likely to provide a discernible "corporate
benefit." Fact-gathering and hearings might generate some clear guidelines
as to what is meant by a "corporate benefit" and what types of transactions are
presumptively illegitimate.
Congress might decide, for example, to exclude from the "corporate
benefit" rule any loan.s made for the purpose of purchasing stock. Or it might
decide that retention loans and any other loans subject to an automatic
"forgiveness schedule" are presumptively illegitimate. It might decide that
only interest-bearing loans can satisfy a "corporate benefit" rule, regardless

201. See, e.g., In re Flutie N.Y. Corp., 310 B.R. 31, 49 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (treating as fraudulent
transfers several purported "loans" to the corporate debtor's chief executive).
202. See, e.g., Katsaros v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (holding that payments characterized by
the taxpayer as "loans" should be treated as compensation).
203. See, e.g., McCurley v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH)318 (holdingthatpaymentscharacterized by
the taxpayer as "loans" should be treated as constructive dividends).
204. See, e.g.,ln re Flutie N.Y. Corp., 310 B.R. at 71 (holding that CEO who received regular loans
from the debtor in lieu of salary was the "alter ego" of the debtor and subject to individual liability).
205. See, e.g., Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 236 Kan. 335, 690 P. 2d 1343 (1984) (holding
without explanation that the loan in question could not reasonably have been expected to benefit the
corporation); Roxbury State Bank v. The Clarendon, 129 N.J. Super. 358, 324 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 1984)
(finding no basis to support the proposition that the corporation could reasonably be expected to benefit
from a loan).
206. See Group Inmobiliario Morales Franco v. Garcia, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5845 (finding that
two corporate officers who had taken out a $100,000 loan had offered no evidence to show that the loan
benefited the corporation in any way); Dupuis v. Pierre's Sch. of Beauty Culture, Inc., 1995 Me. Super.
LEXIS 515 (finding that outstanding loans had "provided no benefit to the corporation").
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of the purpose of the loans. I express no opinion on these issues here. 207
These are matters for the deliberative process.
B. Deal with Procedural Issues
If Congress is to revisit the question of insider loans, it not only should
consider the substantive issue of when insider loans should be made, but also
address procedural issues governing the grant of insider loans. These issues
include ( 1) whether retroactive board approval of an insider loan is legitimate,
or whether all such loans should be approved in advance; (2) whether any sort
of "loan plan" is permissible in public companies and, if so, whether such
plans must be subject to advance shareholder approval; (3) whether real-time
disclosure of insider loans should be required, or whether annual disclosure
adequately protects investors; (4) whether the terms of the loans (including
loan forgiveness schedules) should be disclosed and, if so, using what format;
and (5) what documentation-and forms of security-should be required in
connection with insider loans.
In any event, it is time for Congress to revisit the anti-loan provision. In
comments during the question-and-answer session at this Symposium, Congressman Oxley revealed that he had encouraged Senator Schumer to initiate
that process.
IX. CONCLUSION
In the immediate aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley' s passage, here's what one
critic had to say about the anti-loan provision:

Section 402 was adopted in haste and anger, without the normal give
and take of the legislative process that would have occurred with
hearings, committee reports, and debates on the floors of the House
or Senate. The actual language used to effect the Congressional purpose, such that it is, has adversely affected a broad sweep of standard
compensation practices. In applying Draconian penalties, Congress
made no apparent attempt to distinguish between the outrageous on
[the] one hand, and the immaterial and customary on the other hand.
The result has been a great deal of distress and chaos among directors
and executive officers ....208
Should we care about the alleged distress today, nearly three years later?
I suggest the answer is yes. First, the anti-loan provision is overbroad-far in

207. In previous work, I have suggested some guidelines for determining when a "corporate benefit"
is likely to be achieved. Barnard, supra note 14, at 261.
208. Lybecker et al., supra note 167, at 10.
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excess of what's necessary to curb misconduct. Second, corporations have
already found numerous ways of circumventing the provision at shareholders'
expense.209 Third, if Congress intended by enacting this provision even
indirectly to curb increases in executive compensation, that effort has failed. 210
Finally, legislation like this, which emerges without the benefit of a
deliberative process, casts doubt on the seriousness with which members of
Congress approach their important legislative work. In the case of the antiloan provision, they can do better.

209. For example, even though retention loans may have disappeared, retention bonuses have not.
That is, rather than making a loan with a forgiveness schedule, public companies since Sarbanes-Oxley
have been paying retention bonuses. The only difference is in the timing of the taxable event. The same
thing has happened with split-dollar life insurance. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, 11re Sarbanes-Oxley
Yawn, supra note 7, at 961 (noting that, instead of utilizing split-dollar life insurance policies, "[t]he
emerging solution ... is to classify [the payment of premiums] as a bonus . . .."). As for loans to facilitate
the purchase of stock, "[e]xecutive compensation committees are using cash bonuses, restricted stock
grants, and phantom stock grants to replace stock purchases financed with loans." Ashlea Ebeling, 11re
Lending Game, FORBES, May 10,2004, at 182.
210. See Claudia H. Deutsch, My Big Fat C.E.O. Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, at§ 3, p. I
(tracking recent rises in CEO compensation).

